The goal of this paper is to assess, for the rst time, the empirical impact of "Keynes' beauty contest", or "higher order beliefs", on asset price volatility. The paper shows that heterogeneous expectations induce higher order beliefs and that heterogeneous expectation asset pricing models theoretically generate more volatility than rational expectation models. The paper also explains how, with some assumptions on the distribution of public and private information, a model with higher order beliefs can be empirically estimated. The model is then applied to annual data of the American stock market. The results show that a model with higher order beliefs generates a level of volatility in line with the price volatility observed on the market.
Introduction
In the past 25 years, nancial economists have spent a lot of time and attention in assessing the empirical validity of rational expectation asset pricing models. The common hypothesis of these models is that the stock prices should reect the present value of rationally expected future payo!s.
Although the rational expectation hypothesis constitutes the basis of most contemporary asset pricing models, its empirical support is rather weak.
The rst major critics against such models came from Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981) , who argued that the price volatility observed on the market is too large to be justied by rational expectation models.
These two papers are at the origin of numerous other articles, which have tried to explain this excess volatility puzzle in the framework of rational expectations.
After some early technical improvements (see, e.g., Schiller 1987 and 1988) , research has concentrated on asset pricing models with stochastic discount factors. The idea is to build an asset pricing model with additional economic variables, which generate a time-varying discount factor, and check if the additional variability brought by these new factors can match the excess volatility. 1 However, neither of these factors seems to explain all of the excess volatility (Shiller 2003) . Furthermore, recent studies, which do not use the classical volatility test, have also found evidence against rational expectations models (Zhong, Darrat and Anderson 2003) .
Confronted with the apparent empirical failure of rational expectation models, many researchers have argued that some "non-fundamental" factors may be at the origin of price movements. Behavioral nance deals speci-cally with such market "irregularities" and has put forward di!erent possible explanations to the excess volatility puzzle. 2 In particular, Campbell and Cochrane (1999) propose a model with habit formation, which theoreti- 1 Many factors have been proposed as possible source of excess volatility. The most common are consumption and expected ination (see Wickens 2003 for a recent study with these two variables). Other factors are, for example, tax rate changes, production volatility changes or transaction costs changes. 2 See Barberis and Thaler (2002) or Shiller (2003) for a survey of the answer that behavioural nance gives to excess volatility in stock markets.
cally generates excess volatility through changes in risk aversion. Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) introduce loss aversion to explain the puzzle. After calibration, both models replicate several distinctive features of the stock markets, such has, in particular, the observed volatility.
This paper explores another potential "non-fundamental" factor, namely the impact of "Keynes' beauty contest" on asset prices. The name of this e!ect comes from Keynes' famous metaphor, in which he suggests that, in order to form their demand for an asset, investors not only forecast the future payo!s but also try to guess other market participants' forecasts and others' forecasts of others' forecasts, etc (Keynes 1936) . In this situation, investors are said to have "higher order beliefs". Townsend (1983) , in a general framework, and Basak (2000) , in the context of stock markets, theoretically show that higher order beliefs induce higher price volatility than rational expectations do. 3 This additional volatility is caused by the fact that investors react to variations generated by decisions of others and to the noise in such decisions. This phenomenon is called endogenous uncertainty by Kurz (1974) . Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2004) also show that higher order beliefs can induce a disconnection between the price and its fundamental value.
Even if the role of higher order beliefs in explaining the excess volatility puzzle is theoretically acknowledged, no empirical estimation of their e!ect has been made yet. The aim this paper is to ll this gap and to quantify the empirical impact of Keynes' beauty contest on stock price volatility. To pursue this empirical goal, we contribute to the theoretical literature by elaborating a Heterogeneous Expectation Asset Pricing Model (HEAPM) with constant relative risk aversion, time-varying discount rate and a timevarying risk premium (cf. Section 2.1). 4 We explain how the HEAPM generates additional price volatility (cf Section 2.2). We then present a 3 Miller (1977) , Harrison and Kreps (1978) , Morris (1996) is that the volatility implied by the HEAPM seems to correspond to the one observed on the market (cf. Sections 6 and 7). In that sense, higher order beliefs might be a plausible explanation to the excess volatility puzzle.
We nally present some additional empirical results on how the investors incorporate public and private information into their expectations.
2 An heterogeneous expectation asset pricing model
The model
As suggested by Keynes (1936) , when agents have heterogeneous expectations about asset's future payo!s, the demand for asset of each agent will not only reect his own expectations, but also his beliefs about other agents'
expectations. This can be formally shown in a simple asset pricing model.
Consider an overlapping generation economy where, at time !, a new generation of investors, indexed on the unit interval [0; 1], enters the market. 5 At the beginning of period !, each investor chooses a portfolio, which maximizes the expected utility of her future wealth (" !+1 ). In the second period (period ! + 1), she sells this portfolio to the next generation of investors. 6 Each investor can either invest in a risky asset or in a risk free bond. We 5 The choice of an overlapping generation model with very short-lived agents is an important characteristic of this model. This hypothesis has been made for two reasons:
rstly, it signicantly simplies the solution for the price equation, and secondly, as shown by Allen, Morris and Shin (2003) , the e!ect of higher order beliefs on the price is bigger when investors have a short investment horizon. Thus, short-lived agents allow us highlighting the e!ects of higher order beliefs on the price. Note that this assumption nds its justication in Section 3 and does not have any implications for the results of this section. 6 Two hypotheses are implicit in this model: 1) the investors live only two periods and 2) they consume only in the second period. Even though these hypotheses are clearly restrictive, they are not implausible for an economy where markets are mainly driven by traders who are regularly assessed on the basis of their portfolio wealth.
assume that investors have power utility # (" !+1 ) = ("
, where % # is the constant relative risk aversion of investor &. 7 We also assume that, at the end of period !, each investor is replaced by a new investor with the same relative risk aversion. Finally, we assume that asset returns are log normal.
The solution to the individual maximization problem described above is (see e.g. Campbell and Viceira 2002, p. 29):
where ' #$! is the fraction of wealth that investor & puts into the risky Assuming that the relative risk aversion coe"cient, the expected return and the expected volatility are jointly independent for each investor, the aggregating of Equation (1) over all the agent gives:
where From Equation (2), we can recover the asset price by using the following rst order Taylor approximation of the asset log return (see e.g. Campbell and Shiller 1988): 7 The advantages of using power utility rather than exponential utility or quadratic utility are discussed by Cambpell and Viceira (2002), p. 24.
where -! is the asset price at the beginning of period ! (and 1 ! its logarithm), . !+1 is the dividend distributed at the end of period ! (and , !+1 its logarithm), and / and 0 are parameters. Plugging this approximation into Equation (2) yields:
The rst part of the right hand side of Equation (3) tells us that the price is a function of the average expected asset return. The second part can be understood as a time-varying risk premium, which increases with the average expected asset return volatility, the average fraction invested in the risky asset and the average relative risk aversion.
As the price and the dividend are usually non stationary variables, we can rewrite Equation (3) in terms of the price-to-dividend (P/D) ratio
where
is the "adjusted dividend growth rate" and
. By solving this equation forward, we get the nal equation:
where Equation (5) is the formal counterpart of Keynes' beauty contest metaphor.
Indeed, the investor & will have the following expectation for the future P/D ratio: 8 The P/D ratio is a stationary variable in the sample used for this paper (cf. Section
This equation shows that, in order to forecast the P/D ratio, investor & will use her expectation of the average of the other agents' expectations. In particular, in this model, the investor must guess the average expectation of the future adjusted dividend growth, of the future risk free return, of the future asset return volatility and of the future fraction invested in the risky asset. Thus, forecasting the price implies forecasting others' forecasts.
This shows that, on a market with heterogeneous expectations, higher order beliefs do theoretically play a role in the explanation of the price.
HEAPM as a possible solution to the volatility puzzle
One consequence of the HEAPM is that it induces a higher price volatility than the traditional rational expectation model. To see that, let us rst dene the rational expectation P/D ratio as:
where ( ! is the traditional rational expectation operator and * 2 & "+1 is the rational expectation of the asset return volatility. This equation is the equivalent of Equation (4) when the investors have an identical expectation and when this expectation is rational. We can dene 9 # ! and : # ! such that:
where 9 # ! and : # ! represents the deviation of individual &'s expectation from the rational expectation (in terms of volatility for : # ! ). Aggregating the previous equations over all individuals yields:
where9 ! and: ! correspond to the average deviation from the rational expectation. Combining Equation (4), (7) and the two previous equations gives:
If we take the unconditional variance of this expression, we have:
! is independent from the average deviations from the rational expectation9 ! and: ! , the covariance term is equal to zero and we have:
Thus, if the average expectation of asset returns or its average expected volatility diverge from the rational expectation and if this di!erence varies in time, the HEAPM implies a volatility, which is higher than with the rational expectation model. This could constitute a theoretical explanation to the excess volatility puzzle. The question is now to determine if this explanation is empirically relevant.
3 The HEAPM with private and public information Unfortunately, the validity of the HEAPM in Equation (5) Given this structure, it is possible to deduct agent i's expectations and his beliefs about others' expectations (cf. Section 3.2) and thus, to compute an equilibrium equation for the P/D ratio (cf. Section 3.3). As, in equilibrium, the past P/D ratios contain some information about the future adjusted dividend growth, the investor can use them as the public signal (cf. Section 3.4). Our nal equilibrium equation will therefore be a mix of heterogeneous non observable private signals about future adjusted dividend growth and a public observable signal based on the past P/D ratios.
The information structure
Let us assume that each investor has two sources of information about the future adjusted dividend growth 3 !+( : a public signal and a private signal.
The public signal 3 # !+( is the best forecast of z !+( given by the past P/D ratios available at time !. Expressed in a di!erent way:
777# is the public information set. Note that the current ratio 2 ! is not included in the public information set. This corresponds to a market with the following sequence of decisions: 1) the agents form their expectations, 2) they place their orders on the market according to their expectations and 3) the price -! is set in order to clear the market. 
. We assume that the average signal over all the agent is unbiased, thus R 1 0 6 # !+( ,& = 3 !+( . We nally assume that both signals are normally distributed and that the relative precision of the private signal to the public signal is the same for each investor and is constant in time.
To be complete, we have to specify the information about the average fraction of wealth invested in the asset (' ! ) available to each investors. We make the hypothesis that this variable is equal to ' ! = ' + @ ! , where @ ! are i.i.d. and ' is not directly observable. Therefore, the expectation about ' ! is constant in time and the same for everyone, which implies in particular that 4 !+( = 4.
Forecasting the others' forecasts
Equation (5) can be split in two parts: rstly, the iterated average expectation of 3 !+(+1 and, secondly, the iterated average expectation of the average variance + !+(+1 . With the informational framework describes in the previous section, it is possible to compute a solution for these two terms. The next two sections present the solution for the iterated average expectation of adjusted dividend growth and for the iterated expectations of the average variance, respectively. 
Forecasting the iterated average expectation
where A is the relative weight given to the private signal. This relative weight reects the relative precision that the agents associate to each signal. 9 No assumption is made on how the agents assess this relative precision. They can, for example, give a subjective weight to each signal or use their objective precisions. Taking the average of Equation (9) over all agents yields:
The relative precision is, by assumption, identical for every investors and constant in time (cf. section 3.1). The latter assumption will be relaxed in Section 7. Note that the precision of each signal can vary in time; only their relative precision is assumed to be constant. Now consider the case where the investor is still situated at time !, but wants to forecast the average expectation at time ! + 1 of the adjusted dividend growth rate at time ! + 2. Using the previous result for the average expectation of 3 !+2 and taking its expectation for investor & yields:
Plugging equation (9) for 3 !+2 into the previous equation gives:
More generally:
Thus, investor &'s expectation of the average expectation is a weighted average of the public and the private signal where the weight of the public signal increases with the forecast horizon. Equation (10) is equivalent to:
The rst term of the sum in the right hand sight of Equation (11) is the future adjusted dividend growth rate's expectation given the public information. Investor & adjusts this forecast with the second term of the sum to take into account her private information. These rst two terms represent the agent's expectation about the future adjusted dividend growth rate given the public and the private information. In addition, the investor makes a last adjustment to her expectation since she tries to guess the average expectation of future adjusted dividend growth rate and not its true value.
Therefore, the last term of the sum in Equation (11) reects the "beauty contest" e!ect on investor &'s expectations. Note that the coe"cient of this last term is negative, which implies that the weight of the public signal is bigger in the nal expectation than it would be if the investor had to guess the true future value of the dividend. This reects the fact that each agent knows that the other agents also observe the public signal and that everybody uses it in their forecast. Therefore, as the public signal enters into every individual expectations, it is a better predictor of the average opinion than the private signal. Note also that the weight of the public signal becomes bigger with the forecast horizon. This is due to the fact that with a longer horizon, the number of average expectations' layers is higher and therefore, the resemblance between the average expectation and the best forecast of the dividend decreases.
The aggregation of Equation (10) over all the agents yields:
Forecasting the variance
In the particular framework of Section 3.1, the problem of the iterated average expectation of the "average variance" (( is also the same for each investor. Then, if everyone has the same expected variance, its average expectation is known to everybody and is equal to the traditional iterated expectation.
More formally, the proof is the following: recall rst that * 2
is the expected variance of ) !++ for investor & at time ! + B ! 1. By using the same rst-order Taylor approximation as in Section 2.1 yields:
The variance of 3 !++ can be inferred from the variances of the two signals.
As, by assumption, both signals are normally distributed with the same variances for everybody, the inferred variance of 3 !++ is the same for each agent. 10 We therefore have:
The last step is to compute the volatility of the P/D ratio expected by each investor (* 2 #$, "+% that the P/D ratio volatility is a function of the future adjusted dividend growth volatility. Under this assumption, the P/D ratio volatility is indeed a function of the future adjusted dividend growth volatility, 11 which makes the investor's ex-ante beliefs consistent with their ex-post observation. Finally, if the P/D ratio volatility is a function of the adjusted dividend growth volatility, then as the latest is the same for everybody, the former is also identical for every investor. Thus:
and(
HEAPM with public and private information
Plugging the result about the iterated average expectation of the adjust dividend growth rate in Equation (12) and of the iterated expected return volatility in Equation (15) into Equation (5) yields the P/D ratio equation:
Note that if the agents give all the weight to the private signal (A = 1), the P/D ratio is a function of the discounted sum of future dividends. This is equivalent to a model with perfect foresight. This result is due to the fact that, if everybody follows her private signal only, the individual errors will be cancelled out by the aggregation among investors.
Furthermore, as explained in Section 3.2.1, if the investors were trying to guess the true value of the adjusted dividend growth and not the average expectations, or in other words, if they were not taking into account the beauty contest e!ect, the price would be equal to:
1 1 See proof in Appendix A.
The "pure" beauty contest e!ect on the price can be isolated by subtracting Equation (17) from Equation (16) .
Note that the beauty contest e!ect is equal to zero when A = 1 and when A = 0. This result is not surprising since in the rst case, each investor relies on her private signal only and does not try to guess the average expectation by using the public signal. In the second case, everybody uses the public signal only, thus, everybody has the same expectation and we end up in the traditional case of homogeneous rational expectation.
How to extract the public signal from the price
If the P/D ratio is driven by Equation (16), then it value partly reects the true value of future adjusted dividend growth (3 !+( ). Therefore, its value contains some public information about the future adjusted dividend growth. The next two sections show how to extract this public information from the P/D ratio.
Public signal on the adjusted dividend growth
Let us rst dene the new variable D ! as:
Note that at time !, the variable D ! is known since it is constituted of the current P/D ratio and the best forecasts of the adjusted dividend growth rate and of the volatility of the asset return given the public information.
Equation (16) can be rewritten with this new variable:
From this last equation, it can be deduced that:
At time !, none of the variables in the last equation are know, but if is possible to forecast them using the public information. This yields:
The left hand side of this equation is the expected adjusted dividend growth rate given the public information, which precisely corresponds to the denition of the variable 3 # !+( . 12 After replacing D ! by its denition, it is possible to solve the equation for the variable 3 # !+( . This yields:
where 2
is the best forecast of the P/D ratio at time ! + 8, given the public information available at time ! and + # !+( is the best forecast of the asset volatility at time ! + 8, given the public information available at time !.
Public signal on the asset return volatility
Similarly to the public signal on the adjusted dividend growth rate, it is possible to compute the best forecast of the asset return volatility given the public information (+ # !+( ). To do so, we combine Equation (14) and (15):
We have that * 2
Using Equation (20) again yields:
Combining the previous equation, Equation (19) and Equation (26) gives:
Taking the expectation at time ! reduces it to:
Finally, by plugging this last equation into Equation (23), we get:
How to test the model
One way to test the validity of the HEAPM is to compute the theoretical P/D ratio given by Equation (16) and then to check if its dynamic has the same empirical characteristics as those observed on the market (cf. Section 4.2). But before doing that, we have to estimate the empirical value of the public signals 3 # !++ and + # !++ , which are necessary to compute the theoretical P/D ratio.
Estimation of the public signals
As Equation (24) shows, estimating the public signal + # !+( is equivalent to forecasting the future volatility of the P/D ratio given the public information available at time ! (which is constituted of the past P/D ratios). For the public signal 3 # !+( , Equation (22) tell us that we have to forecasts the future value of P/D ratio given the information available at time !. It is possible forecasts the P/D ratio and volatility given its past values by using an autoregressive equation of order 1 with conditional heteroskedasticity of order F (AR(1)-ARCH(F) model). Then, using this estimated model, it is possible to compute the best public forecast for 2 !++ and + !++ . Concretely, the AR(1)-ARCH(F) model takes the following form:
where K ! is a white noise and L ! = ; E) ! [2 ! ]. This system can be rewritten in vectors and matrix terms to facilitate the forecasts. 13 It takes the following form:
Given this process, we can compute the best forecasts, which are equal to:
Thus, once the parameters of the AR(1)-ARCH(F) model estimated, it
is possible to compute the 3 # !+( 's and the + # !+( 's in Equation (16) given the past information by using the best forecasts given above and Equation (22) and (24) . The theoretical P/D ratio is then equal to:
where:
where I .$/ are identity matrices of dimension (1 % 1) and (F % F), respectively, and g .$/ are 1 and F raw vectors, respectively, with all element equal to zero except for the rst one, which is equal to one. These vectors select the rst row or the rst element of the next matrix or vector, respectively.
Indirect tests of the model
Unfortunately, Equation (25) cannot be directly tested since the future adjusted dividend growth rate is not known. However, it is possible to get an approximation of the theoretical P/D ratio by using the adjusted dividend growth rates observed ex-post. 14 Then, one can get an idea of the validity of the model by examining the importance of the di!erences between the theoretical P/D ratio, which corresponds to the price-to-dividend ratio that would prevail if the model given by Equation (25) was true, and the observed P/D ratio. One way to do that concretely is to test if the variance of the theoretical P/D ratio is equal to the variance of the observed P/D ratio.
Data and parameters

Dataset
The HEAPM is estimated with annual data on American stocks' prices, div- Price Index, extended back to 1871 by using the data in Cowles (1939). 15 The interest rate is the 6 -month prime commercial paper rate.
Preliminary veri!cations
Before going estimating the model, we checked that the variables are stationary. Table 1 The test shows that the hypothesis of unit root is rejected at a 1% condence level for the adjusted dividend growth rate on the entire period.
For the P/D ratio, the hypothesis of unit root is rejected at a 1% condence level for the period 1871-1995. If we introduce the next eight years, this hypothesis is rejected at a condence level slightly higher than 5%. Formally, 1 4 We made the assumption that the adjusted dividend growth rates after 2003 are equal to their historical mean. The e!ect of this assumption should be marginal for the major part of the sample since the mean of dividend di!erence is close to zero and is discounted.
However, it might a!ect more signicantly the last observations. 1 5 The index reects the total market value of all 500 component stocks at a given date. The market value of a company is determined by multiplying the stock by the number of common shares outstanding. The dividends can be recovered from an index, which is based on the sum of the total monthly dividend for the same 500 stocks. This data set is kindly provided by Rober J. Schiller on his website (http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm). 
Estimation of the parameters
Finally, before estimating the theoretical P/D ratio given by Equation (25) presented in Section ??. Finally, the parameter 4 can be estimated by using Equation (22) . To do so, we use the hypothesis made in Section (3.1), which states that the public signal is an unbiased signal of the future adjusted dividend growth rate. Therefore, the parameter 4 can be estimated by the following regression:
! and + # ! can be replaced by their value derived from the AR(1)-ARCH(F) model as described in Section ?? to get the nal regression equation for the parameter 4: Table 2 gives the estimated parameters for an AR(3)-ARCH(1) model estimated on the entire sample. Once that the parameters of the model are known, it is possible to compute the theoretical P/D ratio for any given relative weight A by using Equation (25) . It is then possible to estimate the relative weight A # for which the theoretical price is the closest from the price observed on the market. To nd this optimal relative weight, we computed the sum of the squared di!erences between the observed and the theoretical P/D ratio given A. We then dene the optimal A # as the relative weight which minimize the sum of the squared di!erences.
Two methods are possible to estimate the parameters of the model and the optimal weight. Firstly, one can estimate the parameters of Equation (25) by using the observations of the entire sample ("overall sample estimation") and then compute the theoretical P/D ratio for each period. This 
Estimated relative weight and volatility tests
The optimal relative weight A # is equal to 07227 with the overall sample method and to 07187 with the rolling sample method. These two results are similar. They mean that, between 1871 and 2003, the investors seem to have given a weight to the public information about four times bigger than the one given to the private information. Figure 1 and 2 show the observed and the theoretical P/D ratio with the overall sample method and the rolling sample method respectively. 16 With both methods, the theoretical price follows relatively closely the price observed on the market. This is particularly true for the overall sample method. In both case, the picture is very di!erent from the traditional graph given by a rational expectation model where the theoretical and the observed price diverge signicantly (see, e.g., Shiller 1981 or 2003). The volatility tests conrm these conclusions. Table 3 displays the test statistics and the 1-values of the volatility test for the optimal value with both methods. The null hypothesis is the equality between the two variances.
For the overall sample method, the tests indicate that it is not possible to reject the hypothesis of equal variances at a 5% condence level. For the rolling sample method, the equal variance hypothesis is rejected at a 5% condence level for all tests but is accepted at a 1% condence level. Note that, with the rolling sample method, the volatility of the model (* 2 = 072749) is bigger than the observed one (* 2 = 071693). The evidence in favour of the model with higher order beliefs are not unquestionable, but formally, both models pass the volatility test at a 1% condence level. Therefore, a model 
Stability of the relative weight
In our HEAPM, the relative weight A is assumed to be constant in time.
This is a rather strong hypothesis. To check if this hypothesis corresponds to the reality, we computed the optimal relative weight over di!erent periods of 20 years. The result for the entire sample and the rolling sample method are displayed in Figure 3 . In these two gures, it is clear that the relative 7 Model with time-varying relative weight: empirical results
Modi!cation of the original model
With a time-varying relative weight, the original HEAPM of Equation (16) can be re-written as:
This model implies that, at each time !, investors choose a di!erent relative weight between the private and the public signal. This relative weight varies for each period, but at time !, it remains constant for each forecast horizon ! + 8. It is still assumed that the relative weight is identical for each investor. Similarly to the constant relative weight, the optimal A # ! , which is di!erent for each period, is dened as the relative weight that Figure 4 : Estimated relative weight (L: overall. R: rolling)
minimizes the squared di!erence between the theoretical and the observed 2 ! at time !.
Estimated relative weight and volatility tests
The estimated relative weights obtained with the overall sample and the rolling sample method are presented in Figure 4 . As suggested by in the previous section, the optimal relative weight seems to vary signicantly in time. Note that with both methods, the periods with a relative weight equal to zero, which corresponds to a situation where investors give no weight to their private signal, are relatively rare and short. The end of the 90s is an exception since both methods indicates that investors have used only the public signal for several years in a row. This could explain the irregularities in the stationary of the P/D ratio mentioned in Section 5.2. Table 4 . With a time-varying relative weight, the hypothesis of equal variance between the observed and the theoretical P/D ratio cannot be rejected at a 5% condence level. 17 This is a signicant empirical evidence in favour of the HEAPM 1 7 The hypothesis cannot even be rejected at a 10% condence level, if we do not take developed in this paper. It seems that a model with higher order beliefs is able to generate a volatility, which is similar to the one observed on the market, whereas rational expectation models fail to produce this feature. 
Conclusion
This paper proposes an asset pricing model, which takes into account investors' higher order beliefs. The particularity of this model is that it can be estimated and thus help to determine if the e!ect of higher order beliefs on the stock price is empirically signicant. The model is estimated with American data on stock prices, dividends, and interest rates for the period between 1871 and 2003. The main conclusion is that higher order beliefs seem to have a signicant impact on asset prices. In particular, the price volatility induced by the model does not signicantly di!er from the volatility observed on the market. In this sense, higher order beliefs appear to be a plausible explanation of the excess volatility puzzle.
In addition to the main conclusion, the paper sheds light on a few other points. First, it shows that heterogeneous expectations induce the beauty contest phenomenon described by Keynes (1936) . In the asset price equation, the beauty contest e!ect takes the form of an iterated average expectation. This iterated average expectation replaces the iterated expectation used in traditional asset price models. Second, after making some further assumptions about the information available to each agent, we give a testable into account the Siegel-Tukey test.
asset price equation. This equation is a useful tool to understand how the agents combine their private and public information to take into account the beauty contest e!ect. In particular, it shows that, in order to guess others' expectations, the agent put more weight on the public signal than they would do if they were trying to guess the future dividends. They do so because, as the public signal inuences everyone's expectation, it constitutes a better predictor of the average opinion that the private signal. 18 Finally, in our model, the price still contain some information about the future payo!s. This paper shows how this information can be extracted from the past prices. The direct consequence of this is that the past prices can be used as the pubic signal described above.
In conclusion, our empirical results indicate that higher order beliefs might play a signicant role in the stock markets. A signicant part of the volatility observed in the price seems to be explained by this phenomenon, rather than by the movements of the fundamentals. This conclusion suggests that adding higher order beliefs to traditional present value model could improve their empirical performance. The model used in this paper is based on some restrictive hypotheses, but its simplicity and its value added in terms of empirical performances might constitute a promising basis for further developments.
A Volatility of the P/D ratio
From Equation (16) 
